Greece’s Trouble with European Union Accession by Kalaitzidis, Akis & Zahariadis, Nikolaos
 
Cahiers de la Méditerranée 
90 | 2015
Democratic Transition / Ardengo Soffici






Centre de la Méditerranée moderne et contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 June 2015





Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis, « Greece’s Trouble with European Union Accession », Cahiers
de la Méditerranée [Online], 90 | 2015, Online since 01 December 2015, connection on 08 September
2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cdlm/7951 
This text was automatically generated on 8 September 2020.
© Tous droits réservés
Greece’s Trouble with European
Union Accession
Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis
 
Introduction
1 The global sovereign debt crisis that followed the collapse of the housing bubble in the
United States in 2008 claimed its  first  victim quickly,  one of the smallest and most
vulnerable economies in the European Union (EU): Greece. Nearly four years later, the
country is ravaged by an economy that reminds many of us the Great Depression of the
United  States  in  the  1930’s  with  staggering  unemployment  rates,  vulnerable  social
groups falling victim to sharp budgetary cuts and struggling to stay afloat, populism
and violence in  their  streets.  International  commentators  and news reporters  have
exceeded themselves pointing out the spectacular collapse of the Greek economy and
drawing historical parallels which will not stand the test of time, such as Greece and
interwar  Germany  calling  Greece  a  modern  Weimar  Republic.1 Others  wondered
whether the Greek institutional structure would survive.2 Still  others –as recently a
German politician  from the  conservative  wing  of  Chancellor  Merkel’s  government–
wondered whether Greece, having no other choice, would exit the EU and its currency
structures altogether.3
2 We will closely analyze why Greece’s accession to the European Union has failed so far
and where this failure leaves the country vis-à-vis its European partners. Firstly, we will
conduct  a  historical  review of  political  developments  since  the  country’s  return to
democracy in 1975 to set a baseline. We contend that the historical development of the
country  is  central  to  understanding  why  the  country  has  fared  so  badly  recently.
Secondly, we will analyze the institutional structure of the country, which we claim is
partly to blame for its bad financial condition these days. In this section we will mainly
argue that it is the nature of the Greek State, which came to dominate every aspect of
the Greek economic activity,  that  has  played a  central  role  in  its  current  troubles.
Thirdly,  we  will  review  Greek  administrative  capacity  and  we  will  argue  that  the
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country  lacks  sufficient  capacity  to  deal  with  the  pressures  exerted  on  it  by  its
accession to the European Union. Fourthly, we will argue that the country’s success at
becoming part of the Eurozone made it difficult to conceive a vision for Greece’s future
in the European Union. The failure to have a strategic vision led to the conduct of
Greece’s European policy in ad hoc manner with uneven results. Considering the cases
of the other Mediterranean countries and Ireland, it is necessary to underscore that
Greece’s failure cannot be singularly understood as an aberrant case study. Nor should
Greece be pigeonholed as a particularly egregious example of what can happen to a
small  European  partner  due  to  the  imbalance  of  economic  prowess  between  the
members of the Eurozone. 
 
Political Development Since 1975
3 Greece  is  a  “third  wave”  democracy,  to  use  Huntington’s  term,  and  as  such  an
authoritarian past dominates its current political system.4 The political spectrum was
reorganized in 1975,  the communists  eventually  became a legal  political  party,  and
within  a  decade  Greece  became  a  two-party  system5 with  electoral  competition
dominated  by  the  conservative  New  Democracy  (ND)  and  the Panhellenic  Socialist
Movement  (PASOK),  with  a  solid  but  rather  small  group  of  voters  opting  for  the
Stalinist communist party (KKE). The stability of the party system was predicated on
the colonization of the state by the political parties in charge and especially PASOK,
which ruled on and off for over two decades.6 
4 While the consolidation of the political party system in Greece brought a great deal of
stability with only three parties present in the three hundred-seat legislature, it also
brought a great deal of autonomy to the governing PASOK. The socialists proceeded to
colonize the state apparatus in an effort to settle old scores, right the wrongs of the
past and develop a full and generous welfare state.7 Every part of the state apparatus
was taken over by PASOK functionaries, irrespective of their qualification, but on the
basis of their loyalty and association with the leaders of PASOK. Thus the political party
and the state became one. 
5 In addition to democratic consolidation, the socialist governments had to operate at an
additional level –Europe– as a full member of the European Community. Before it came
to  power  in  1981,  PASOK  had  promised  to  hold  an  election  on  the  future  of  the
European membership and was rather caustic in its pronouncements of foreign policy
vis-à-vis the United States as part of its plan to strengthen Greek independence. 8 In
essence,  PASOK  was  addressing  the  ghosts  of  Greece’s  past  while  electioneering.
However, when it came to power it settled rather well in the business of dealing with
the  foreign  powers  it  opposed.  Part  of  these  developments  was  the  result  of  the
leadership of Andreas Papandreou whose personality cult was paramount in Greece of
the 1980’s, eventually making the two virtually indistinguishable.9 Seeing the benefits
of European Union (EU) accession, the Greek government subsequently adopted not
only a participatory policy towards the EU but also a demandeur attitude, extracting
more financial concessions from its partners.10
6 The first  two Papandreou administrations are critical  in the formation of post-1975
democratic  institutions  in  Greece  as  well  as  the  ideology and political  culture  that
permeate Greece today. The start of the party was based on clear ideological opposition
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to years of exclusion from the democratic process and as such it enjoyed increasing
support (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Greek Election Results 1974-2000 11
7 When they came to power, Papandreou’s governments increased Manichean rhetoric
by dividing the people of Greece into “those with us” and “those against us” in order to
rule. Pappas notes “By portraying Greek society as torn between the ‘forces of light’
(meaning  PASOK  voters  and  sympathizers),  and  the  ‘forces  of  darkness’  (meaning
opposition forces), the new government used the state and its resources to satisfy its
own electoral constituencies and reap further electoral gains, while passing the cost on
to the whole society”.12
8 In the 1990’s the conservatives rebounded for a brief time and ruled for three years, but
their economic austerity programs were really unpopular and their efforts to “clean
up” corruption were seen as another right-wing witch hunt by those with wealth and
power in the country since its inception. At the end, it was a foreign policy debacle that
brought  the  government  down.  The  conservative  government  of  ND  was  called  to
manage the impact of the collapse of Yugoslavia and its coming civil  war. It  did so
poorly, mostly because of a split in the ranks between pragmatists and nationalists.13
The  Prime  Minister  of  Greece  at  that  time,  Kostantinos  Mitsotakis,  attempted  to
negotiate  the  name  of  the  southernmost  province  of  Yugoslavia,  called  Former
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  in  return  for  Greek  recognition.  Meanwhile  his
Foreign  Minister,  and  today’s  party  leader  and  Prime  Minister,  Antonis  Samaras,
opposed any inclusion of the name “Macedonia,” traditionally seen as Greek: the name
designates the adjacent prefecture of Greece. PASOK was also vehemently opposed to
the  name  including  the  historical  designate  “Macedonia.”  When  the  government
collapsed in 1993, so did all the domestic efforts for structural adjustment and reform
of public administration. 
9 The “second cycle” of PASOK rule came at the end of Papandreou’s life and the handing
over of party reigns to the more moderate economics professor, Kostantinos Simitis.
Leading  a  team  of  technocrats,  Simitis  attempted  some  structural  reforms,  most
notably  successfully  liberalizing  telecommunications  and  banking.  He  achieved
Greece’s most prominent success in 2000, its entry to the Eurozone. Its most notable
failures were the inability to modernize the state and move away from the populism of
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the Papandreou era and the dominance of certain interest groups rooted in the public
sector. The most powerful interest group in Greece is the teachers union, which to this
day  and  in  the  height  of  the  crisis  resisted  all  changes  proposed  by  consecutive
governments. In fact, teachers were so successful that they have been able to fend off
four ministers of education from both PASOK and ND. In the end, Simitis was rewarded
for his efforts with nearly a decade of uninterrupted rule, despite lacking the charisma
of the founding father of the party.14
10 The  conservative  return  to  power  started  with  a  government  led  by  the  founding
father’s  nephew,  also  named  Kostantinos  Karamanlis.  He  essentially  managed  the
legacy of PASOK but was unable to implement any structural reform despite warnings
signs  of  a  deteriorating  Greek  economy.  Similarly  to  Mitsotakis  a  decade  before,
Karamanlis’ rule was pitted against powerful interest groups, mainly from the public
sector, which ensured his government would be short-lived. Just five years later, in
2009,  the  socialists  were  back  in  power  despite  warnings  from the  ND leader  that
structural reforms were needed immediately, lest the country go bankrupt. Socialist
populism was rewarded once more when their leader and son of the founder of PASOK,
Giorgos Papandreou, famously declared “there is money” in the treasury, dismissing
ND’s warning (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Greek National Elections 2004-2012 15
 
Institutional Performance
11 How did Greece fare economically throughout its thirty year EU membership? Was the
political  party  system  successful?  Finally,  how  did  the  political  culture  change
overtime?  It  is  our  contention  that  although  Greece  became  more  prosperous  and
seemed to enjoy relative growth, especially during the second decade of PASOK’s rule in
the 1990’s,  the basic  restructuring of  the economy was only superficial  and sector-
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driven.  It  thus exacerbated Greece’s  economic woes culminating with the economic
crisis  of  2010.  Restructuring  did  not  take  place  because  of  the  stunted  growth  of
democratic  institutions and its  parochial  and reactionary political  culture.  In thirty
years  of  EU  membership,  the  Greeks  were  able  to  move  up  the  scale  of  economic
development without much effort and in the process became more obstinate regarding
change and uncompetitive regarding production.16
12 The first contributing factor of this complicated institutional-political performance is
populism. Populism has been a staple of party politics since 1975. As Pappas argues,
“PASOK  remained  permeated  by  populism,  which  fed  cronyism,  corruption  and
inefficiency and led to its defeat at the polls in 2004”.17 Populism in the case of Greece
meant an inefficient and bloated state as well as an onerously expensive welfare state.
The state apparatus increased over fifty percent within a decade and continued to grow
until  the economic crisis.18 The early PASOK leaders chose this artificial  increase in
personnel  as  a  way  to  reward  loyal  supporters  and  extend  patronage  to  the
constituency. It became a way of life and continued even in the third decade of Greece’s
membership in the EU albeit in a more concentrated form.19 Patronage was not only
implemented  through  public  employment  but  also  through  the  welfare  state, with
pensions and health care coverage ultimately reaching levels  among the highest  in
Europe (11.5 percent of  GDP).20 In addition,  a  side effect  of  populism was cronyism,
especially regarding select sectors of the economy and powerful interest groups. An
indicator of how it worked at its most egregious form, was defense procurement, which
ended  in  a  major  scandal  and  several  members,  including  the  former  minister  of
Defense and deputy Prime Minister of  the Papandreou government,  in jail.21 PASOK
established itself as a truly populist party.22
13 The second contributing factor in Greece’s complicated institutional development has
to do with entrenched interest groups dominating politics and in many ways benefiting
from the populist policies of PASOK and later ND. Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis argue that
poor governance and high administrative burden helped the creation of these powerful
lobbies and entrenched interests.23 In most  Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and  Development  (OECD)  economies,  business  interests  dominate.  But  in  Greece
traditional industries, agriculture and professional associations had come to dominate
these groups after two decades of cronyism.24 EU agricultural policy helped enormously
the farmers of Greece who became one of the most important and influential interest
groups in the country, distorting prices of agricultural land and vocally demanding the
Greek government to defend their interests within the EU.25 As the state grew, so did
the power of professional associations and interest groups (συντεχνίες in Greek), such
as lawyers, truckers, taxi drivers, and others. They remain the most obstinate groups to
changes  inscribed  in  the  bailout  packages,  which  are  guided  by  the  European
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (known
as Troika). Dominating the news these days are university professors, public employee
groups such as ministry employees, judges, lawyers, teachers and doctors. They have
become  so  powerful  that  they  have  been  able  to  resist  most  proposed  reforms  by
instigating an endless cycle of conflict and strikes.26
14 The  third  element  of  Greece’s  institutional  development  is  its  reactionary  culture.
Papandreou’s  nationalist  rhetoric  and PASOK’s  populist  demeanor in addition to its
near obsession with the global underdog have created a political culture conducive to
resistance to imaginary boogie men from the West, including the EU.27 Resistance to
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change in the face of economic catastrophe is not accidental; it is a result of years of
Manichean  ideological  constructs  presented  to  the  Greek  public  as  legitimate
alternatives. The phenomenon was augmented by virtual immunity from the law even
for those perpetrating the gravest of crimes. For example, it took Greece thirty years to
apprehend  the  longest  lived  and  one  of  the  deadliest  domestic  terrorist  groups  in
Europe, the 17th of November, not to mention it took a few highly publicized deaths
before  the  police  moved  against  the  neo-Nazi  political  party Χρυσή  Αυγή  (Golden
Dawn). Acting with impunity28 is a way of life in Greece, and at the basic level people
are assured of being able to live so on political grounds. 
 
Administrative Adaptation to the European Union
15 The Greek political party system has produced a rather stable two party system but
failed to create incentives and initiate the process by which the country would adopt an
efficient  and  rational  administrative  system.  Alivizatos  argues  that  Greek
parliamentarians do not have any viable strategy for the institutional reform of the
country.29 One of the greatest drawbacks is the inability to transform legal texts into
actual public policy. Sklias and Maris argue that Greece tries to adopt the European
acquis  communautaire and  other  European  directives  but  has  trouble  successfully
implementing  them.30 It  is  not,  for  example,  an  accident  that  the  Open Method of
Coordination has failed in Greece since it is one of the most statist member states in the
EU, making it hard to transpose a decision-making mechanism which would take away
power from the central administrative apparatus.31 Sklias and Maris also connect the
relative underdevelopment of Greece vis-à-vis its European partners with the expansion
of the Greek State in the twenty years of socialist rule.32
16 Most attempts to restructure Greece since the 1990’s failed because of the rise of statist
ideology  aided  by  the  permeation  of  the  state  by  political  parties,  which  allowed
corruption  and  patronage  to  run  rampant  in  the  country.  As  a  result,  capacity
diminished in public administration at a time when the government gladly accepted
more  responsibilities  to  implement  EU  directives.  Attempts  to  realign  capacity  to
responsibility failed because of resistance by the same public sector employees whom
politicians hired in the first place. The fear of losing benefits in a non-meritocratic
system took away any incentives on the part of employees of all political persuasions to
accept possible losses, even when they agreed with reforms. At the end, some symbolic
changes  were  made  to  keep  EU  funds  flowing  without  getting  at  the  root  of  the
problem.33 Consider the rapid growth of the Greek economy in the 1990’s. It was based
on capital created by the liberalization of certain sectors, mainly telecommunications
and banking. But the vast majority was financed by the huge debt that has bankrupted
the state, which was funneled by a political party-funded “financial elite” ruling the
country.34 Powerful interests demanded and got their “pound of flesh”, acquiescing to
the  raiding  of  the  public  treasury.35 The  results  of  government  effectiveness  are
evident, in Graph 1 where Greece is lagging well behind most of its southern neighbors. 
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Graph 1. Governance Indicators in Selected EU Countries 36
17 Governance indicators  are compiled by the World Bank and are summarized by an
index, which consists of six main dimensions: “Governance consists of the traditions
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process
by  which  governments  are  selected,  monitored  and  replaced;  the  capacity  of  the
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them”.37
18 When the country joined the Eurozone, corruption and patronage became a way of life
in  a  cycle  where  most  state  developmental  projects  financed  by  borrowing  were
handed out to political cronies, party affiliates and individuals or groups with personal
relations to powerful politicians. Even multinational corporations had to pay bribes to
gain access to the Greek market. A good example is the Siemens debacle in which the
German corporation paid nearly all political parties to gain special favors and contracts
during the 2004 Olympic Games and equipment procurement by Greek Telecom OTE.
Finally, the scandal was resolved by the signing of a mutual agreement in which the
German  multinational  paid  Greece  €330 million  settlement.38 In  a  rather  unique
moment for Greek politics, the Minister in charge admitted in the Greek parliament in
2010, that he received DM200.000 from Siemens.39 The corruption index compiled by
the World Bank places Greece dead last among her peers (Graph 2). 
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Graph 2. Control of Corruption in Selected Countries 40
19 The question is: did EU leaders know about Greece’s conundrum and what did they do
about it? The answer is unfortunately both disheartening and surprising. While Troika
officials have recently expressed deep regret in overestimating Greece’s administrative
capacity,41 they should not have been surprised. Since 2005, incoming governments and
the European Commission repeatedly expressed distrust over Greek figures due to lack
of administrative capacity.42 Yet it  was only in 2010 that the European Commission
formally rebuked Greece for falsifying public finance data, “systematic overspending,
endemic tax evasion and persistently overoptimistic tax projections”.43 While EU allies
did  not  create  Greece’s  predicament,  their  lack  of  public  condemnation of  dubious
Greek practices suggests a certain measure of duplicity. It does not escape notice that
most of Greece’s foreign debt up to the second bailout package was held by French and
German  banks.  Public  rebuke  would  have  lowered  Greek  ability  to  borrow  at
advantageous interest rates, decreasing profits of key government supporters in those
countries.44 Moreover, the consociational mode of EU integration with its emphasis on
subsidiarity as a way of defusing political conflict encouraged an arm’s length response.
45 Institutional  stability  in  the  presence  of  segmented  polities  requires  voluntary
compliance.  As  long as  everyone agreed on deeper  integration in  politically  highly
contentious areas, such as European Monetary Union (EMU), individual governments
were allowed to maintain their national systems with any accompanying flaws. 
 
Leadership
20 Political leadership is a necessary ingredient in public policy. Political leaders not only
broker compromises among competing social interests but they also set the tone on
how to tackle societal problems and help voters think through diverse perspectives on
problems, debate difficult choices, and provide deliberative processes and democratic
forums.  Because  leaders  exercise  the  coercive  power  of  the  state,  they  must  also
demonstrate  they  are  using  it  fairly.46 Failure  to  do  so  gives  rise  to  allegations  of
corruption and mismanagement, lowering a country’s economic performance. While
the EU’s institutional environment played a role in consolidating the democratic
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credentials of Greek politicians since 1981, it affected neither their quality nor their
inability to articulate a clear vision for the country’s future. 
21 Public  policy  requires  decision  making  which  is  something,  it  seems,  Greek
governments  lack  even  though  many  government  ministers  and  a  former  Prime
Minister have written on the subject. It is most illuminating to look at the writings of
Nikos Christodoulakis, former Minister of Finance and Development. He starts his 2006
book  by  highlighting  the  important  challenges  for  Greece  to  achieve  complete
convergence with the EU: 1) restructuring the Greek universities and allowing foreign
universities to operate in Greece; 2) improving Greek competitiveness in the business
sector;  3) restructuring  the  agricultural  sector;  and  4) simplifying  public
administration. Neither political party has achieved these goals to this day, including
during his  own tenure in power in the early 2000’s.47 He goes on to claim PASOK’s
successes and touts the achievement of 73% of average EU per capita income. He finally
blames ND for the explosion of the Greek Debt in 2004. ND actually revised the national
statistics,  which  the  government  provided  to  Eurostat,  exposing  some  “creative
accounting practices”.48
22 The most important issue is recognition that Greece needs institutional restructuring,
which has not really happened to this day. Kostas Simitis, Socialist Prime Minister from
1996 to 2004, elevated the notion of modernization to the highest possible level and was
both praised and derided for his obsession with the term. In the book that followed his
retirement from PASOK’s leadership, he includes an illuminating speech given in the
year 2000 in which he lays out his vision for the decade, as it was given at the annual
Thessaloniki  Expo  where  traditionally  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  lays  out  his
government’s economic plans.49 The former Prime Minister reminds his listeners of the
struggle against the dictatorship, in which he was one of the leaders, and thus positions
his own understanding of modernization in the Manichean world of “us against them”
just like his predecessor. He seems to consider the Olympic Games as a focal point of
economic development, and warns his detractor and opposition forces to modernizing
Greece that he would fight them.50 Despite failing to achieve any of these lofty aims, the
most important issue here is that they do not constitute a clear program. To say that
you want the country to be modernized is one thing; to achieve it, is quite another.
What matters is how one goes about implementing needed measures. In this area, he,
and others before and after him, failed miserably.
23 Disillusioned  with  modernization,  disgruntled  voters  dumped  Simitis  and  elected
Kostas Karamanlis, ND’s leader, in 2004. He promised to improve the economy, stamp
out  widespread  corruption  and  promote  a  more  transparent  and  effective  state
administration.  Rising  unemployment  and  inflation,  inability  to  reform  higher
education,  an inept  response  to  wildfires  in  2007  and failure  to  control  protracted
violence  following  the  shooting  of  a  16-year-old  in  December  2008  lowered
expectations and damaged his standing at the polls. The financial audit of the Greek
economy in 2004 failed to yield the expected results. It increased political tension by
predictably blaming the previous socialist government for the economic mess, but it
also undermined Greek credibility among EU allies.
24 The leadership gap continues unabated to this day and includes both the conservative
party, which notoriously did nothing to formulate any vision or correct the ills that it
accused PASOK of bringing to the country,  as well  as the new left  powerhouse,  the
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), which has succeeded PASOK as the second largest
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party in Greece. Even during the current economic crisis, Greek leaders have succeeded
in living up to low expectations. For example, Antonis Samaras, Prime Minister since
2012, refused to approve the first bailout package in 2010, even though he claimed to
agree with most of the terms, because his party’s vote… was not needed to pass the
bailout program through parliament!51 He refused to go along with reforms undertaken
by the provisional government stitched together in November 2011, even though his
party supported and participated in the government!  As a result,  and despite some
success in reducing budget and current account deficits,  the government’s  “success
story” continues to be undermined by populist rhetoric and credibility deficit in the
eyes of the voters.52 Alexis Tsipras, leader the main opposition party SYRIZA, has shown
similar proclivities. In his speech to the first party congress in July 2013, he claimed,
“scrapping the memoranda and renegotiating the loan deal is the basis on which we
will establish the roadmap for an exit from the crisis”.53 How that will be accomplished
remains a mystery to the very day.
25 To be sure, voters are partially at fault. Seeking reelection, politicians are acutely aware
of constituent demands. The strong clientelist bonds between the country’s political
elite and various social and economic groups have prompted a habitual preference for a
corrupt status quo than an uncertain but possibly beneficial future. Characteristic of
this  insidious  symbiosis  is  Theodore  Pagkalos’  outburst:  “we  all  wasted  resources
together (τα φάγαμε όλοι μαζί)”.54 The problem with the former socialist Vice-Premier’s
declaration  is  that  it  is  true,  but  inaccurate.  It  reflects  reality,  but  it  also  throws
everyone in the same pot and distributes blame equally to all participants. And when
everyone is  to  blame,  no  one  is  at  fault.  Quite  the  contrary,  good leaders  have  an
obligation  to  frame  issues,  explain  alternatives,  and  make  tough  and  occasionally
politically costly decisions. While voters are to blame for serially supporting corrupt
and incompetent politicians (despite rare pleas of  ignorance),55 political  leaders are
ultimately responsible for successes or failures in governance.
 
Conclusion
26 In this paper we argued that Greece’s failure to adapt to the EU and become a successful
member of the Eurozone has several domestic roots: 1) its historical development and
transition to democracy in the 1970’s allowed for Manichean type of politics to take
place in the country; 2) these confrontational politics were exploited by the socialist
party in its effort to establish its dominance and colonize the state; 3) the colonization
of the state by the party led to inevitable distortions in public institutional structure,
with  populism  at  the  helm  and  patronage  and  cronyism  on  its  side;  and  4) the
leadership of Greece is unable to provide a long-term vision of the country as a full and
productive member of the EU. Our argument supports Taylor’s claim that European
integration has had mutually reinforcing but also seemingly contradictory results.56 On
the one hand, integration has led to the entrenchment of the state by allowing Greek
elites  to  centralize  power  and  promote  policies  and  changes  that  suit  their
constituents, often by spreading the cost to the broader domestic population and EU
taxpayers. The example of Greek farmers is instructive. On the other hand, integration
was allowed to continue in directions that also benefited elites.  The case of EMU is
again instructive. The end result has been a false sense of prosperity. The present crisis
has shattered this cozy bargain, raising serious discontent in many EU quarters. In the
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face  of  high  unemployment,  economic  recession  and  a  shrinking  welfare  state,
disintegration is no longer taboo. As Tsoukalis informs: “trust in the financial system
and  in  political  elites  has  taken  a  big  blow.  The  feeling  of  injustice  and
disempowerment is strong among many citizens who perceive the rapidly changing
world around them as a threat”.57 A new grand bargain is needed that will tame the
centrifugal forces, but also reinforce the benefits of membership. EU membership has
enabled  political  development  and some economic  growth without  the  need to  lay
strong foundations to sustain both processes.  The current crisis  is  the price Greeks
need to pay for such foolishness.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  argues  that  although  Greek  membership  has  produced  results  in  terms  of
democratization and political stability, the Greek economy has not fared as well despite large
infusions of EU sums. The main reasons for this outcome are: 1) institutional divergence between
Greece and its European partners; 2) lack of Greek administrative capacity; and 3) the inability to
come up with a concrete vision of what Greece’s membership would mean for the country. We
argue that in adapting to the European acquis the Greeks paid more attention to the letter of the
law than to the spirit. For domestic political reasons, administrative reforms never really took
hold and were put off by successive governments. Finally, the post-democratization culture was
pushed forward by a political party that did not buy into EU membership (at least initially) and
that  for  domestic  reasons co-opted its  democratic  partners  into building a  welfare  state  the
country could not afford. The Greek case illustrates the point that without a robust economic
plan stemming from membership, democratization may succeed but membership will ultimately
fail.
Cet article affirme que même si l’adhésion de la Grèce à l’Europe a produit des résultats positifs
en termes de démocratisation et de stabilité politique, l’économie grecque n’en a pas profité pour
autant,  et ce,  en dépit de l’injection de fortes sommes de la part de l’Union européenne. Les
principales raisons tiennent à 1) la divergence institutionnelle entre la Grèce et ses partenaires
européens, 2) l’absence de capacités administratives en Grèce et 3) l’incapacité de produire une
vision concrète de ce que l’appartenance de la Grèce à l’Europe pourrait signifier pour le pays.
Nous soutenons qu’en s’adaptant aux acquis européens, les Grecs ont prêté plus d’attention à la
lettre qu’à l’esprit de la législation. Pour des raisons qui tiennent à la politique intérieure, les
réformes  administratives  n’ont  jamais  été  vraiment  adoptées  et  ont  été  remises  à  plus  tard
gouvernement après gouvernement. Enfin, le climat culturel qui a suivi la démocratisation a été
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alimenté par un parti politique qui, du moins au début, ne s’est pas investi dans l’appartenance
européenne  et  qui,  pour  des  raisons  de  politique  intérieure,  a  récupéré  ses  partenaires
démocratiques en construisant un modèle social dit du Welfare state que le pays ne pouvait pas
se  permettre.  Le  cas  grec  démontre  que  sans  un  programme  économique  solide  arrimé  à
l’appartenance européenne, la démocratisation peut réussir, mais l’appartenance est destinée en
dernière instance à l’échec.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Grèce, Union européenne, crise de la dette de la zone euro, capacité administrative,
démocratisation
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